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A PLAN TO STRENGTHEN 
THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT 
Bryan H. Druzin* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Paris Agreement on climate change reached in December 2015 was a 
historic achievement in international diplomacy.1  Nearly every nation in 
the world—from North Korea to the United States—pledged to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to prevent a global rise in temperature beyond 1.5 
degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit).2  The scientific community is 
telling us that a rise in the Earth’s temperature beyond 2 degrees Celsius 
(3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) will yield catastrophic effects upon the planet’s 
weather.3  The Paris Agreement—like all international agreements—stands, 
however, upon the unstable foundations of mutual commitment and good 
will.  The agreement provides no consequences if countries do not meet 
their commitments.  Consensus of this kind is exceedingly fragile.  Even a 
trickle of nations exiting the agreement will, in all likelihood, trigger the 
withdrawal of more governments, bringing about a total collapse of the 
agreement.  Environmental agreements are uniquely susceptible to this 
pattern of failure—everyone needs to be onboard and stay onboard.  At the 
heart of the problem is what is known as the “tragedy of the commons”—a 
unique dynamic that sabotages cooperation.  On a domestic level, the 
tragedy of the commons is easily solved through regulation.  On a 
supranational level, however, governance mechanisms tend to collapse.  
Cooperation is crippled by the lack of a central authority with sufficient 
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coercive power to prevent countries from overexploiting shared resources—
our air, oceans, marine life, et cetera. 
Sustainable use of common-pool resources is extremely tricky to 
maintain.  Indeed, the failure of the Kyoto Protocol is a stark testament to 
this challenge.4  This short discussion offers a potential solution to this 
crisis of coordination.  This Article proposes a mechanism to mitigate the 
impact of the tragedy of the commons and help ensure that the world’s 
nations live up to their commitments under the Paris Agreement.5  The 
challenge to international cooperation that the tragedy of the commons 
creates is pernicious.  The question of how to tackle the tragedy of the 
commons—and I say this without a trace of exaggeration—is arguably the 
most pressing problem we face as a species.  We need a stable framework 
for collective action now.  The Paris Agreement offers our best hope yet for 
rallying international cooperation.  Yet a cloud of cynicism already 
surrounds the agreement.  After the collapse of Kyoto, a failure of the Paris 
Agreement could fatally hobble global environmental governance. 
I.  WHAT IS THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS? 
In a tragedy of the commons, a group of actors behaving according to 
rational self-interest undermines the entire group’s long-term interests by 
depleting a common resource.6  The classic example is a group of farmers 
overgrazing a common pasture until it can no longer be grazed.7  Because 
each farmer wants to maximize their income by increasing the number of 
their own cattle—a tempting option because the costs of doing so are 
shared—the pasture becomes overstocked with cattle and quickly becomes 
overgrazed.  In this kind of situation, the problem is that no one can trust 
 
 4. Robert B. Semple Jr., Editorial, Remember Kyoto?  Most Nations Don’t, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/opinion/sunday/remember-kyoto-most-
nations-dont.html [http:// perma.cc/CS27-3X68]; see also Jeffrey Ball, Why the Paris 
Climate Talks Won’t Amount to Much, WALL STREET J.:  EXPERTS (Nov. 19, 2015, 10:06 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/11/19/why-the-paris-climate-talks-wont-amount-to-
much [http:// perma.cc/R9G7-944L]; Lucas Bretschger & Eth Zurich, To Get a Climate 
Agreement, First Set Out Principles for Fair Cost-Sharing, ECONOMIST (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:46 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/11/calculated-approach [http:// 
perma.cc/MN9R-MQP3]. 
 5. The reader should note, however, that this approach in fact has a wide breadth of 
application.  Its usefulness extends far beyond the Paris Agreement and may be utilized to 
reinforce any species of treaty.  It could be used to reinforce existing, as well as future, 
treaties of any kind.  However, as explained below, this approach is especially suited to 
solving a tragedy of the commons dynamic. 
 6. Although the concept can be traced back as far as Aristotle, the tragedy of the 
commons was first formulated in a rigorous way by Garrett Hardin in the late 1960s. See 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).  Hardin was not the 
first to recognize the problem. See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common 
Property Resource:  The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishery:  
The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116 (1955); see also ARISTOTLE, 
POLITICS bk. II, at 1148 (Richard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House, Inc. 
1941) (c. 350 B.C.E.) (“For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care 
bestowed upon it.”). 
 7. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 1244. 
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that other group members will conserve the resource, which triggers a race 
to the bottom—a race to deplete.  The tragic irony is that even when 
everyone wants to conserve the resource, players in this odd game of 
distrust are driven by rational self-interest to deplete the common resource 
to everyone’s disadvantage, including their own.8  In a tragedy of the 
commons, everyone loses.  Cooperation is extraordinarily difficult to 
sustain—suspicion of just one “cheater” will cause cooperation to unravel.  
The tragedy of the commons manifests with respect to a broad range of 
common-pool resources.  Clean air, forest and ocean management, and 
desertification are but a few salient examples.  Global warming, however, is 
perhaps the ultimate example. 
So what can be done?  There are standard solutions to the tragedy of the 
commons.  These are:  (a)  top-down regulation:  wherein third-party 
enforcement coordinates the parties’ behavior through negating, with the 
threat of sanctions, any incentive to cheat; (b)  privatization:  wherein the 
externality of overexploitation is internalized to the resource owner, thereby 
providing an incentive to preserve the resource; and (c)  voluntary small 
group cooperation:  wherein, as the political economist Elinor Ostrom 
demonstrated (for which she won a Nobel Prize), rules and institutions can 
emerge to ensure shared management of resources in close-knit 
communities.9 
All these solutions, however, falter on an international level.  Indeed, the 
tragedy of the commons is uniquely malicious between state actors.  The 
first solution—top-down regulation—is extraordinarily difficult to achieve 
because the global community is a fragmented jumble of legal authorities 
that lacks a central authority with true coercive strength able to enforce 
regulation.  The second solution—privatization—is an unattractive option 
for several reasons:  (1)  there are serious normative issues in creating 
private monopolies over global resources, (2)  it is often logistically 
impossible to privatize global commons, (3)  there is no guarantee that 
private actors will have sufficiently long time horizons (indeed, these actors 
may be publically listed companies legally obligated to maximize short-
term profits), and (4)  the poor may be priced out of the resources and 
underprivileged communities may be bypassed altogether in terms of access 
to the resource.  Finally, Ostrom’s approach is simply not viable on the 
international level.  By definition, it does not pertain to global actors.  The 
international community is the antithesis of a close-knit community able to 
develop strong norms of conservation.10 
 
 8. In game theory, this cooperative dilemma can be modeled as a two-person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD).  However, in a multiperson PD, the “game” typically becomes even more 
unstable. 
 9. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (arguing that common-pool problems may be solved by 
voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state or privatization). 
 10. Although, given a sufficiently high degree of repeated interaction, it is not 
inconceivable that the international community may demonstrate some of the traits of a 
small community. 
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II.  A PLAN TO SOLVE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
In light of these deficiencies, this discussion proposes a solution.  The 
idea—the commons management fund deposit scheme (CMF)—would 
work as follows:  states would contribute an upfront “deposit” to an 
international regulatory body with the understanding that part or all of their 
contribution would be forfeited if they fail to honor their conservation 
commitments.  The goal of the scheme, however, is not to remedy particular 
instances of noncompliance; rather, it is to stimulate a sufficient degree of 
initial confidence in other parties’ level of commitment in order to prevent a 
tragedy of the commons from emerging.  The working assumption here is 
that states want to comply.  This is the reason why nations enter into 
environmental agreements such as the Paris Agreement in the first place.  
The problem is simply one of trust.  The CMF is designed to build trust. 
The CMF would be an international regulatory body that could be 
established under the auspices of the United Nations.  Any group of states 
could register a treaty (i.e., the Paris Agreement) with the CMF, and the 
deposit would be kept in reserve.11  This deposit would have to be large—
very large.  The deposit with accrued interest would be returned to member 
states after a specified period of time (i.e., the conclusion of the treaty).  For 
minor infractions, a deduction could be made.  For major breaches, the 
entire deposit would be forfeited (to the other parties in order to incentivize 
monitoring).  The CMF would create a regulatory body that would be 
charged with investigating alleged breaches.  To accommodate the disparity 
in wealth between states, a percentage-based variant of the deposit scheme 
based on gross domestic product (GDP) or other relevant metrics could be 
designed.  A percentage-based deposit would maintain its efficacy in that it 
would signal the same degree of commitment (building trust).  Such a 
scheme has the benefit of remaining financially accessible to all states 
regardless of the size of their economies.  It could be left to the parties to 
determine how large a deposit would be needed to signal commitment and 
build trust as the parties themselves are best positioned to know how strong 
of a commitment signal is required.  The proposal here is that this 
framework should be grafted onto the Paris Agreement to strengthen 
compliance and avert the potential collapse of the accord. 
III.  WHY THIS PLAN IS UNIQUE 
How does the CMF differ from other treaty compliance mechanisms?  
The tragedy of the commons is a unique dynamic that calls for a unique 
solution.  This becomes immediately apparent when one understands why 
most treaties fail.  The usual problem for treaty compliance is that parties 
may cheat if incentive structures change, so ex post (after the fact) punitive 
measures are required to stop cheating.  However, in the case of treaties 
 
 11. The CMF need not be limited to merely environmental agreements.  However, the 
focus here is on the tragedy of the commons, a problem that manifests starkly with respect to 
conservation. 
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exhibiting a tragedy of the commons dynamic, incentive structures may not 
change at all; yet, simply due to a lack of trust, parties otherwise willing to 
honor their commitments may still cheat.  In a tragedy of the commons, the 
mere fear of others cheating induces cheating.  This is not the case with, for 
example, a multilateral trade agreement (at least it is not the primary 
problem).  Such agreements are less vulnerable to perceptions and thus can 
better withstand the blow of a party withdrawing from the agreement or 
cheating.  In a tragedy of the commons situation, because the primary 
problem is one of trust, robust ex ante (before the fact) signaling can be 
particularly effective in solving the dilemma.12  A sufficiently large deposit 
achieves this, producing an initial burst of confidence that stabilizes the 
agreement and keeps the tragedy of the commons at bay. 
Ex post penalties are far weaker signals.  This is because enforcement is 
actually quite rare in multilateral environmental agreements.13  Actors can 
simply withdraw from such agreements.  In other cases, violations often go 
unpunished because parties to the treaty do not wish to bear the costs of 
enforcing the agreement.14  A tragedy of the commons is unique in that so 
much turns on mere perception—the perception that others will not live up 
to their commitments triggers a downward spiral into noncooperation.  As 
such, it makes more sense to “front-end” costs.  This allows parties to signal 
their commitment at a far more crucial stage, nudging perceptions in the 
right direction and stymieing the emergence of a tragedy of the commons.15 
CONCLUSION 
The overall efficacy of the approach is difficult to predict.  The only true 
test of the scheme would come with actual implementation.  What is not in 
serious debate, however, is this:  action on a massive scale needs to be 
undertaken now to prevent further climate change.  The stakes are high.  
Now more than ever, a solution to the tragedy of the commons on a 
supranational level is desperately needed.  The international community 
pulled off a remarkable feat of consensus in Paris.  Now, however, comes 
the challenge of keeping these commitments.  We must now move quickly 
 
 12. I have written elsewhere on the usefulness of signaling in stabilizing cooperation. 
See, e.g., Bryan Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order:  Public International Law 
As a Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423 (2014) (arguing that treaties that 
require positive actions, as opposed to merely the absence of action, encourage compliance 
because this allows for signaling); see also Bryan Druzin, Law, Selfishness, and Signals:  An 
Expansion of Posner’s Signaling Theory of Social Norms, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5 (2011) 
(arguing that the primary function of social norms is to signal cooperation). 
 13. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:  
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 32–33 (1995). 
 14. Beth A. Simmons, International Law, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
352, 367 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
 15. The CMF in fact mirrors strategies employed by commercial actors laboring under 
similar conditions of distrust.  Commercial parties desiring to collaborate where there is no 
third party enforcement (or where such enforcement is unreliable or costly) often ask for 
deeds of guarantee, deposits, or upfront investments in the form of heavy capital costs.  The 
CMF simply brings this same process to the supranational level of treaty compliance 
between nations. 
2016] STRENGTHENING THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT 23 
to prevent the collapse of this fragile consensus by providing a mechanism 
through which countries can clearly signal the seriousness of their 
commitment to each other.  Given the current legal and political 
fragmentation of the world, meaningful action on climate change is a 
formidable task.  Nonetheless, it is critical that the tragedy of the commons 
be brought to heel.  The international community does not have the luxury 
of waiting for the slow, natural advance of global governance.  We must 
accelerate this process through any means at our disposal if we are to halt 
the climactic impact of over two hundred years of break-neck industrial 
production. 
